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x*.lthough the 1980s ushered in the
second-longest economic expansion in
U.S. history, regional economic perform-
ance was uneven during the decade.
These regional disparities were accom-
panied by a deterioration in the quality
of bank loans and a sharp increase in the
number of bank failures. Indeed, more
than half of the banks that have failed
since the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration was founded in 1933 did so
during the 1980s.
Now, in the wake of a national reces-
sion, policymakers have become con-
cerned that fragility in the financial sec-
tor may be constraining the supply of
credit and hampering the economy's
recovery. It is widely feared that the
pressures on bank profitability and cap-
ital positions have caused lenders to
restrict the flow of credit required to
fuel a growing economy.
In a recent address to Congress, Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Green-
span voiced concern about the role that
credit is playing in the current economic
scenario, stating "... the restraint on
credit availability at depository institu-
tions represents a continuing clear risk
to the outlook and, therefore, is a criti-
cal challenge for [monetary] policy."
1
What is underemphasized, however, is
the regional nature of current financial-
sector conditions. Richard Syron, presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, has dubbed problems in the
banking industry a "capital crunch"
that has been more severe in the North-
east than in other areas of the country.
2
Regional disparities in credit conditions
pose a problem for the Federal Reserve,
because they can be difficult to trouble-
shoot with monetary policy tools that
impact credit markets nationally. Al-
though within the past few months the
Fed has both cut interest rates and low-
ered reserve requirements to encourage
bank lending, the impact of these policy
moves is likely to be entirely different
in regions where banks are healthy and
willing to lend than in regions where
bank capital inadequacy is constraining
credit availability.
This Economic Commentary examines
the linkage between credit conditions
and economic activity from a regional
perspective and discusses how the health
of the financial sector can affect eco-
nomic performance when credit markets
are segmented along regional lines.
• The Regional Dimension
of Credit Woes
While concerns have surfaced about a
national credit crunch, both anecdotal
evidence and financial data indicate that
current credit problems are localized in
nature, stemming from regional dispar-
ities in banking performance during the
past decade.
Figure 1 compares the ratio of nonper-
forming loans to total loans for selected
regions to the national ratio from 1982
to 1990. Although the national share of
Pressures on bank profitability and
capital positions have been blamed
for the perceived constraint on credit
availability in the emerging economic
recovery. However, conditions in the
banking industry vary significantly
by region. The authors examine the
potential link between local financial
problems and regional economic
growth, finding evidence of a regional
credit channel.
nonperforming loans was relatively
flat, there were substantial regional
differences in the quality of bank loan
portfolios. During this same period, the
uneven performance of regional econo-
mies became an important focus in as-
sessing the national economy. These
disparities are reflected in figure 2,
which illustrates the growth rate of per-
sonal income relative to U.S. personal
income growth for selected regions be-
tween 1978 and 1990.
The correlation between regional bank-
ing conditions and regional economic
performance is not coincidental. The
regulatory structure of the U.S. banking
industry reflects a long tradition of geo-
graphic barriers in the form of interstate
branching restrictions. These artificial
boundaries have resulted in a banking
system that is more or less regionally
segmented and whose performance is
dependent on the health of local econo-
mies. It is not surprising, therefore, that
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bank failures in the 1980s were concen-
trated in those regions experiencing
economic distress. The most striking
examples were found in the depressed
farm belt and oil-producing regions in
the mid-1980s, and more recently in
the economically distressed Northeast.
• A Regional Credit View
Evidence that regional economic prob-
lems can lead to a deterioration in the
loan portfolio quality of local banks has
important implications for the govern-
ment as it regulates, supervises, and in-
sures these institutions. But from a pol-
icymaker's perspective, another question
is equally important: To what degree do
problems in the local banking sector
affect future regional economic activity?
The notion that credit market activity
may influence real activity has come to
be known as the credit view. Accord-
ing to this view, credit markets are im-
portant in determining the allocation of
resources in an economy for two rea-
sons. First, individuals with profitable
investment opportunities may not have
the financial resources to fund ventures
themselves. Second, investors who fund
projects often do not have complete in-
formation about these ventures and
hence face the potentially large costs
associated with evaluating and monitor-
ing them. Investors do, however, recog-
nize that borrowers who fund highly
leveraged projects may be more likely to
default on their debts. Thus, investors
will impose stricter credit conditions on
these less-creditworthy borrowers to
compensate for the higher costs asso-
ciated with monitoring their projects.
Banks play a vital role in credit markets
by identifying, funding, and evaluating
investment projects. However, banks'
ability to supply credit depends on their
capacity to raise funds. Because much
of the information produced by banks is
confidential, these institutions must be
monitored as well. And, just as the costs
of monitoring an individual borrower
are tied to his creditworthiness, the
costs of monitoring a bank are related
to the risk that it will fail.
Bank equity capital is the buffer be-
tween the performance of bank invest-
ments and bank insolvency. Thus, the
greater a bank's stock of equity capital
relative to potential losses on its loan
portfolio, the more creditworthy the in-
stitution. The credit view suggests that
the creditworthiness of banks affects
their ability to finance risky ventures.
When a bank is in poor financial condi-
tion, regulators (as well as uninsured
depositors and equity holders) should
impose more stringent credit stipula-
tions on the institution. Regulators do
so by limiting the risks that banks may
assume and by enforcing capital require-
ments. Uninsured investors do so by re-
quiring a higher risk-adjusted return.
Diversification helps banks to minimize
the cost of raising funds, as it reduces
their exposure to the risk of any one
loan, or type of loan, and hence their
exposure to failure.
4 However, to the
extent that banks cannot or do not
diversify risks that are costly to moni-
tor, the credit view suggests that the
health of banks' balance sheets affects
their ability to intermediate credit and
to fuel economic growth.
Information costs may be one factor that
limits the ability of banks to diversify
their lending geographically and thus
causes banking markets to be regional.
If it is relatively costly to monitor the
performance of ventures in other
regions, banks will be inclined to con-
centrate their lending activities locally.
This implies, however, that their profit-
ability is more directly related to the
economic fortunes of the local market
than if their loan portfolios were more
geographically diversified. Regulatory
restrictions limiting geographic branch-
ing further reduce banks' ability to
diversify across regions.
Thus, the credit view implies that the in-
formation costs that cause the health of
local banks to be tied to the health of
the local economy may also cause the
performance of the local economy to be
tied to the health of local banks. It sug-
gests that economically depressed
regions may find it difficult to fund a
recovery because of the associated
deterioration in the region's financial
health, even though other regions may
be flush with funds. For example,
capital-impaired Boston banks may beTABLE 1 VARIABLES RELATED TO RELATIVE STATE OUTPUT GROWTH
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unable to lend to a risky-but-profitable
biotechnology firm in New England,
while healthier Cleveland banks may
find monitoring the firm too costly. In
the extreme case, profitable ventures
may not be undertaken because of local
credit problems, while less productive
ventures may blossom in more econom-
ically healthy areas. In short, disparate
regional credit health can cause the
return from investment activity in the
overall economy to decline.
To the extent that this credit view accu-
rately characterizes the credit channel
operating in regional credit markets to-
day, banks in financially unhealthy re-
gions need to raise capital and strength-
en their balance sheets. It should be
noted, however, that the regional aspect
of credit markets is in some measure an
unavoidable result of the very informa-
tion and monitoring costs that give rise
to financial intermediaries in the first
place.
6 Thus, it is doubtful that the rele-
vance of the regional credit view will
disappear with the easing of interstate
branching restrictions, as some banks
will not find it profitable to operate
under an interstate branching structure
and with the associated geographic
diversification of their portfolios.
• Testing for a
Regional Credit Link
Most empirical studies of the credit
view have looked for a link between
credit and economic activity at the na-
tional level. However, a regional
credit channel may be obscured by data
that are so broadly aggregated.
To examine how a region's financial
health is related to regional economic
growth, we examined state-level data
between 1980 and 1986 and tested
whether the credit health of borrowers
helps to explain the future growth of
real gross state product (GSP) relative
to the growth rate of the national econ-
omy (GNP). The credit view implies
that financial problems should be nega-
tively related to a local economy's
ability to fund investment activity and,
hence, negatively related to future eco-
nomic growth. Moreover, the relation-
ship between financial-sector conditions
and economic activity should be differ-
ent when a local economy is experienc-
ing difficulties than when it is booming.
Quite simply, when a state economy is
performing poorly, it is more likely that
financial-sector conditions may con-
strain its growth. To look for this effect,
we split the data between low-growth
and high-growth state economies.
Several measures of financial health
were used in this study, including the
liabilities of failed businesses, commer-
cial banks' loan loss reserves (reserves
set aside for expected loan losses),
return on commercial bank equity (the
ratio of net income to equity capital),
and the volume of bank loans. The vol-
ume of liabilities associated with busi-
ness failures is related to changes in the
overall creditworthiness of business bor-
rowers, as the flow of debt in default de-
creases their creditworthiness and in-
creases their cost of funding future
ventures. Similarly, loan loss reserves
are related to the expected default losses
on existing loan portfolios and therefore
should be negatively related to the
creditworthiness of banks.
To the extent that the return on bank
equity capital (ROE) reflects the risk-
adjusted return to bank lending, a
higher ROE may reflect tighter lending
standards imposed by banks making
riskier loans. Thus, ROE should be neg-
atively related to the credit quality of
bank loan portfolios and hence to
banks' ability to finance future local
economic growth.
The relationship between bank loans and
economic activity is somewhat more dif-
ficult to interpret in terms of the credit
view. Loans are made based on lenders'
expectations about the future profitabil-
ity of projects, as well as on their cur-
rent capacity to fund these ventures.
Thus, new lending could reflect lenders'
expectations that coincidentally are
good predictors of future output, or
credit availability that actually does af-
fect future output. Because of this am-
biguity, we include past bank lending
growth as a proxy for the expected prof-
itability of local investment opportuni-
ties. We interpret bank balance-sheet
measures that reflect the financial health
inherited from the past (such as loans in
default) as more likely to reflect a causal
channel from credit conditions to eco-
nomic activity.
The results of this study support the
credit view and point to a channel run-
ning from regional credit markets to re-
gional economic performance. In every
test we ran, we found a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between creditwor-
thiness and output growth in state econ-
omies that are growing more slowly
than the national average (see table 1).
That is, the results indicate that a state's
poor credit health was a constraint on
credit availability in states experiencing
relatively low growth. Moreover, this
credit channel was less important in
states experiencing high growth—a
result suggested by the credit view. Re-
gional credit conditions appear to be
more important in economies that are
performing poorly and thus may inhibit
their ability to recover.• Conclusion
Current concerns about credit availabil-
ity have raised the issue of whether
monetary policy should be used to con-
front problems with credit quality in the
banking industry. The regional credit
view examined here suggests that the
tools of monetary policy may be ill-
suited to this task. Current financial
problems appear to be the result of
regional capital inadequacy, such as the
"capital crunch" plaguing the Northeast,
rather than a "credit crunch" resulting
from the general unavailability of funds.
In addressing the policy implications of
a regional credit channel, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between policies
affecting financial market structure and
those aimed at promoting noninflation-
ary growth. While lowering interest
rates, for example, may temporarily in-
crease the profit margins of capital-
impaired banks, such a policy may not
be sufficient to jump-start regional
lending. And monetary policy tools,
which can temporarily influence bank
credit availability at the national level,
are likely to be an inefficient solution
to this essentially regional problem.
Moreover, such an approach could
have undesirable inflationary effects.
Alternatively, the regional credit view
does suggest that a longer-run solution
to the current credit constraint may
require focusing on those factors that
prompt regional credit market barriers.
To the extent that some state and fed-
eral regulations limit the ability of
banks to diversify across regions, these
restrictions magnify the link between
regional credit health and regional
economic activity. While this study has
not identified the extent to which
branching restrictions induce regional
credit markets, it recommends that the
benefits of such current regulatory
policies should be carefully weighed
against the costs of reduced geographic
diversification in the banking industry.
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